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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 Maria Sarango petitions for review of a Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision dismissing her appeal.   The 
BIA rejected Sarango‟s request for retroactive – “nunc pro 
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tunc” – consent to reapply for admission to the United States 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) because Congress 
delegated authority to consider such requests to the Secretary 
of Homeland Security, thereby depriving immigration judges 
of jurisdiction. Whether an immigration judge has jurisdiction 
to consider a § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) request for consent to 
reapply for admission is an issue of first impression.  We 
conclude that an immigration judge lacks jurisdiction, and we 
will deny the petition. 
   
I. 
 Sarango, a native and citizen of Ecuador, illegally 
entered the United States for the first time in June 1991.  On 
December 14, 1994, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (now the Department of Homeland Security) 
commenced deportation proceedings.  At the conclusion of 
these proceedings, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) granted 
Sarango voluntary departure on or before October 6, 1995.  
Nevertheless, Sarango remained in the United States for over 
three additional years before finally departing on February 25, 
1999. 
   
 Just over a year after her departure, in August 2000, 
Sarango illegally reentered the United States without 
admission or inspection.  Shortly after her reentry, Sarango 
married a United States citizen.  Based on this marriage, 
Sarango applied – using a different alien registration number 
from her original registration number – for adjustment of 
status to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”).  While her status 
adjustment application was pending, on August 27, 2001 
Sarango filed an application for consent to reapply for 
admission to the United States using her original alien 
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registration number.  On October 23, 2001, the INS 
conditionally granted Sarango LPR status for two years.  On 
October 7, 2002, the INS denied Sarango‟s application for 
consent to reapply for admission.  Sarango then sought to 
change her conditional LPR status to unconditional LPR 
status, and the INS granted her request on June 2, 2004. 
 
 On March 1, 2006, during a naturalization interview 
related to her status adjustment application, DHS discovered 
Sarango‟s previous deportation.  DHS then initiated removal 
proceedings by serving Sarango with a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”).  The NTA charged Sarango with removability 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A) alleging that she was an 
alien who is inadmissible: (1) under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having obtained or tried to obtain her 
visa, or other entry document, or entry to the United States by 
fraud or willful misrepresentation; (2) under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for not being in possession of a valid 
entry or identification document at the time of her admission; 
and (3) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), for having been 
ordered removed and then reentering or attempting to reenter 
the United States without being admitted.
1
   
 
 Sarango appeared before an IJ and admitted her 
alienage, her adjustment to LPR status, her previous 
immigration history, and her recidivist violation, but she 
denied the fraud and inadmissibility charges.  Sarango also 
submitted an application for adjustment of status based on her 
                                              
1
  The original NTA, filed on March 1, 2006, contained 
only the first two inadmissibility charges.  DHS then added 
the third charge on October 12, 2006.   
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marriage to a United States citizen and an application for 
consent to reapply for admission into the United States.  
  
On January 16, 2007, the IJ found Sarango 
inadmissible and removable as charged.  Subsequently, on 
April 15, 2008, the IJ, relying on In re Briones, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 355, 371 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that “aliens who are 
inadmissible under [§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)] cannot qualify for 
section 245(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1255] adjustment, absent a waiver 
of inadmissibility”), denied Sarango‟s 8 U.S.C. § 1255 
application for adjustment of status.  The IJ determined that, 
under Briones, Sarango‟s inadmissibility under § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) rendered her statutorily ineligible for 
adjustment of status.  The IJ ordered Sarango removed to 
Ecuador. 
 
  Sarango appealed the IJ‟s denial of her adjustment of 
status application to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”).  Before the BIA, Sarango argued that she was 
eligible for retroactive – “nunc pro tunc”2 – consent to 
reapply for admission pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), and 
that a grant of such relief would waive her inadmissibility.  
The BIA dismissed Sarango‟s petition, first determining that 
Sarango was removable pursuant to § 1227(a)(1)(A) due to 
                                              
2
  The Latin phrase “nunc pro tunc” means “now for 
then” and “permits acts to be done after the time they should 
have been done with a retroactive effect.”  Barden v. 
Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 n.2 (3d Cir. 1990).  Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “nunc pro tunc” as “[h]aving retroactive 
legal effect through a court‟s inherent power.”  1174 (9th ed. 
2009).   
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her inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II).
3
  Next, 
responding to Sarango‟s retroactive consent argument, the 
BIA determined that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to decide 
requests for consent to reapply for admission.  The BIA relied 
on the text of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), which vests authority to 
consider requests for consent to reapply for admission with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Because the authority of 
the BIA and immigration courts is circumscribed by the 
authority of the Attorney General, the BIA reasoned that the 
IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider Sarango‟s request.  Finally, 
the BIA declined to remand or stay Sarango‟s proceeding 
while Sarango applied to the Secretary of Homeland Security 
for consent to reapply because Sarango failed to allege a 
prima facie case for relief.  The BIA issued a final order of 
removal on May 20, 2010, and Sarango petitioned this Court 
for review on June 10, 2010. 
     
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over a final order of removal 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where, as here, the BIA 
issued an opinion, we review the BIA‟s decision as the final 
agency decision.  Espinosa-Cortez v. Att’y Gen. of the United 
States, 607 F.3d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 2010).  We review 
questions of law de novo.  Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of the United 
                                              
3
  Because the BIA determined Sarango was removable 
pursuant to § 1227(a)(1)(A) due to her inadmissibility under § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II), it declined to discuss the other alleged 
grounds for inadmissibility.  A.R. at 4 n.2.  We agree with the 
BIA‟s determination and need not address the other charged 
grounds of inadmissibility.      
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States, 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008).  We owe deference 
to the BIA‟s reasonable, permissible interpretations of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).  INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984); Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 197. 
 
III. 
 We first consider whether the BIA correctly concluded 
Sarango was inadmissible and removable.  We then consider 
whether immigration judges have jurisdiction to consider 
requests for consent to reapply for admission pursuant to § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
 
A. 
The BIA determined that Sarango was removable 
pursuant to § 1227(a)(1)(A).  Removability was based on 
Sarango‟s inadmissibility as an “alien who . . . has been 
ordered removed under . . . any . . . provision of law . . . and 
who enters or attempts to reenter the United States without 
being admitted.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II).  In her 
immigration proceeding, Sarango admitted that she was 
ordered deported in 1995 and that she unlawfully reentered 
the United States in August 2000 without being admitted.  
Consequently, the BIA concluded that the IJ correctly found 
Sarango inadmissible and removable. 
 
 Sarango nevertheless argues that § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) 
does not apply to her because she had been ordered deported 
in 1995, not removed.  This semantic argument is meritless.  
We have repeatedly held, in a variety of contexts, that the 
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terms “deportation” and “removal” are interchangeable.  See, 
e.g., Khouzam v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 549 F.3d 
235, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]his circuit and others have used 
the terms „deportation‟ and „deportable‟ interchangeably with 
the terms „removal‟ and „removable.‟”); Kolkevich v. Att’y 
Gen of the United States, 501 F.3d 323, 326 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2007) (“We use the terms „final order of removal‟ and 
„deportation order‟ interchangeably.”); Avila-Macias v. 
Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] reference to 
an order of removal would encompass an order of 
deportation.”).  We apply the terms “deportation” and 
“removal” interchangeably here, as well.  Therefore, we reject 
Sarango‟s argument and agree with the BIA‟s determination 
that Sarango is removable under § 1227(a)(1)(A). 
 
B. 
We now turn to an issue of first impression: whether 
an IJ has jurisdiction to consider requests for consent to 
reapply for admission under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).  
  
The BIA concluded that the IJ lacked jurisdiction to 
consider Sarango‟s nunc pro tunc consent request under § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).
4
  Rather than resolving Sarango‟s consent 
                                              
4
  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) provides, in relevant part:  
 
Exception.  Clause (i) shall not apply to 
an alien seeking admission more than 10 
years after the date of the alien‟s last 
departure from the United States if, prior 
to the alien‟s reembarkation at a place 
outside the United States or attempt to be 
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request on the merits, the BIA raised the IJ‟s lack of 
jurisdiction sua sponte and rejected Sarango‟s consent request 
on this basis.  To support its reasoning, the BIA focused on 
the statutory text and concluded that “authority to consent to 
an alien‟s reapplication for admission has been delegated to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, not to the Attorney 
General.”  A.R. at 5.  
  
Sarango argues that the BIA incorrectly concluded that 
the IJ lacked jurisdiction to consider her consent request 
under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).  In support of her argument, 
Sarango notes that, in general, an IJ has jurisdiction to 
consider status adjustment applications, including 
inadmissibility waivers.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i); 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.11; 8 C.F.R. § 212.2.  We reject Sarango‟s 
arguments because the plain language of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) 
authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than 
the Attorney General, to consider consent requests in these 
circumstances.  
 
This issue implicates a legal matter, the statutory 
interpretation of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).
5
  We review de novo 
questions regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and we give 
                                                                                                     
readmitted from a foreign contiguous 
country, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security has consented to the alien‟s 
reapplying for admission. 
 
5
  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) is a provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 212(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
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“appropriate deference [to] the BIA‟s reasonable 
interpretations of statutes it is charged with administering.”6  
De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, 622 F.3d 
341, 348 (3d Cir. 2010); see Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 
424-25; Yusupov, 518 F.3d at 197-98.  We review the BIA‟s 
decision interpreting the INA under the Chevron two-step 
inquiry: 
 
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.  If, however, the 
court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue . . . the 
question for the court is whether the agency‟s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute. 
 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.  We now apply these principles 
to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii). 
 
 Our review of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) leads us to conclude 
that Congress clearly intended to vest authority to consider 
requests for consent to reapply for admission with the 
                                              
6
  Determining what constitutes “appropriate” deference 
to unpublished, non-precedential, single-member BIA 
decisions is an open question.  De Leon-Ochoa, 622 F.3d at 
350-51.  Here, as in De Leon-Ochoa, because the issue of 
appropriate deference is not dispositive, we decline to resolve 
this question.  See id. at 351. 
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Secretary of Homeland Security.
7
  Plain, unambiguous 
language compels this result.  The statutory provision at issue 
functions as an exception to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) 
and (II) and permits an inadmissible alien to ask the Secretary 
of Homeland Security for consent to reapply for admission 
after waiting ten years.  The statute makes abundantly clear 
that the Secretary of Homeland Security – not the Attorney 
General – has the authority to consider consent to reapply 
requests.  The statute reads: “Exception.  Clause [8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)] shall not apply to an alien seeking 
admission . . . if . . . the Secretary of Homeland Security has 
consented to the alien‟s reapplying for admission.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). 
 
 The requirement that an alien seek consent from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security is the result of a recent 
statutory amendment.  See Violence Against Women and 
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act – Technical 
Corrections, Pub. L. No. 109-271, sec. 6, § 1182, 120 Stat. 
750, 762 (2006).  Prior to the 2006 amendment, the statute 
read: 
 
 Exception 
 Clause [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)] shall not 
apply to an alien seeking admission more than 
10 years after the date of the alien‟s last 
departure from the United States if, prior to the 
                                              
7
  Because the plain language of the statute makes 
Congress‟s intent clear, we need not reach the second step of 
the Chevron analysis.  Nevertheless, if we were to engage in a 
Chevron step two analysis, we think the BIA‟s interpretation 
of the statute is permissible and reasonable.   
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alien‟s reembarkation at a place outside the 
United States or attempt to be readmitted from a 
contiguous territory, the Attorney General has 
consented to the alien’s reapplying for 
admission.  The Attorney General in the 
Attorney General’s discretion may waive the 
provisions of subsection (a)(9)(C)(i) in the case 
of an alien whom the Attorney General has 
granted classification under clause (iii), (iv), or 
(v) of section 1154(a)(1)(A) of this title, or 
classification under clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of 
section 1154(a)(1)(B) of this title, in any case in 
which there is a connection between –  
(1) the alien’s having been battered or 
subjected to extreme cruelty; and 
  (2) the alien’s –  
   (A) removal; 
   (B) departure from the United  
   States; 
  (C) reentry or reentries into the 
 United States; or 
(D) attempted reentry into the 
United States. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) (2005) (emphasis added).  The 
2006 amendment then deleted the italicized text above, i.e., 
“„the Attorney General has consented‟ and all that follows 
through „United States.‟”  120 Stat. at 762.  Subsequently, the 
2006 amendment replaced the stricken text with “„the 
Secretary of Homeland Security has consented to the alien‟s 
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reapplying for admission.‟”  Id.8  The clear textual changes 
brought about by this amendment indicate Congress‟s intent 
to divest the Attorney General of authority to consider 
consent requests and to endow the Secretary of Homeland 
Security with this authority.   
    
Because the Secretary of Homeland Security (rather 
than the Attorney General) now has the exclusive authority to 
decide consent to reapply requests, the BIA and immigration 
courts necessarily lack the authority to consider these 
requests.  The BIA and immigration courts are agencies 
operating under the authority of the Attorney General, and 
these immigration agencies have authority (deriving from 
statute and regulations) circumscribed by that of the Attorney 
General.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (“The term 
„immigration judge‟ means an attorney whom the Attorney 
General appoints . . . . An immigration judge shall be subject 
to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the 
Attorney General shall prescribe . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.1(a)(1) (“There shall be in the Department of Justice a 
Board of Immigration Appeals . . . . Board members shall be 
attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the 
Attorney General‟s delegates . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1); 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b).  Because the Attorney General no 
longer has authority to consider consent to reapply requests, 
neither do the BIA or immigration courts.   
  
                                              
8
  The 2006 amendment also added a new provision, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(iii), which applies to self-petitioners 
under the Violence Against Women Act.  750 Stat. at 762.  
Sarango‟s argument does not implicate this provision. 
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Finally, we note that the BIA previously has 
recognized that Congress can – and has – limited the 
jurisdiction of the immigration agencies by delegating 
decision-making authority to other federal departments.  For 
example, in In re Ruiz-Massieu, the BIA held that 
immigration judges could not exercise de novo review over 
the Secretary of State‟s finding.  22 I. & N. Dec. 833, 842 
(B.I.A. 1999) (“We conclude that Congress‟ decision to 
require a specific determination by the Secretary of State, 
based on foreign policy interests, to establish deportability . . . 
coupled with division of authority . . . between the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of State, make it clear that the 
Secretary of State‟s reasonable determination in this case 
should be treated as conclusive evidence of the respondent‟s 
deportability.”); see also Matter of Anttalainen, 13 I. & N. 
Dec. 349, 350 (B.I.A. 1969) (concluding that BIA lacked 
authority to review the Secretary of Labor‟s denial of a labor 
certification because “[t]he law . . . makes the issuance of a 
labor certification a matter solely for the consideration of the 
Department of Labor.”).  Here, similarly, Congress passed a 
law making consideration of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) consent to 
reapply requests the exclusive province of the Secretary of the 
Homeland Security.  Neither this Court nor the BIA has the 
power to contravene this explicit congressional directive. 
 
Nevertheless, Sarango insists that two provisions, 8 
U.S.C. § 1255(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e), still give the 
immigration court jurisdiction to consider her consent 
request.  We disagree.  
    
First, Sarango contends that § 1255(i) gives the IJ 
jurisdiction because an alien “[m]ay apply to the Attorney 
General for the adjustment of his or her status to that of an 
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alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1255(i)(1).  To bolster her argument, Sarango relies on 8 
C.F.R. § 1240.11, which permits an IJ to consider an 
application for waiver of inadmissibility in connection with 
an application for adjustment of status.  However, nothing in 
these general provisions conflicts with our reading of § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).  The plain text of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) makes 
clear that the Secretary of Homeland Security – not the 
Attorney General  – has authority to consider requests for 
consent to reapply.  In the specific context of recidivist 
violators of the immigration laws who are inadmissible under 
§ 1182(a)(9)(C), Congress has carved out an exception to § 
1255‟s general grant of jurisdiction to the Attorney General to 
consider status adjustment applications.  
  
Likewise unavailing is Sarango‟s reliance on 8 C.F.R. 
§ 212.2(e).
9
  Sarango reads this regulation to give an IJ 
                                              
9
  8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e) provides: 
  
Applicant for adjustment of status.  An 
applicant for adjustment of status under 
section 245 of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1255] 
and part 245 of this chapter must request 
permission to reapply for entry in 
conjunction with his or her application 
for adjustment of status.  This request is 
made by filing Form I-212, Application 
for Permission to Reapply.  If the 
application under section 245 of the Act 
has been initiated, renewed, or is pending 
in a proceeding before an immigration 
judge, the district director must refer the 
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jurisdiction to consider her consent request.  Sarango over-
reads this regulation, and her interpretation is contrary to the 
BIA‟s decision in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866 
(B.I.A. 2006).  Primarily, this regulation requires, as a 
threshold matter, that an applicant apply under 8 U.S.C. § 
1255 for adjustment of status.  8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e).  But 
Sarango is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under 
§ 1255 because she is not “admissible to the United States for 
permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A); see In re 
Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 371.  Consequently, Sarango falls 
outside the scope of 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(e).   
 
Moreover, the BIA held in In re Torres-Garcia that an 
alien who is inadmissible pursuant to § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) 
cannot seek retroactive permission to reapply for admission 
under 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.2(e) and (i)(2).  23 I. & N. Dec. at 874-
75 (“[T]he very concept of retroactive permission to reapply 
for admission, i.e., permission requested after unlawful 
reentry, contradicts the clear language of section 212(a)(9)(C) 
. . . .”).  We see no reason to depart from the BIA‟s Torres-
Garcia decision interpreting this clear statute.  Indeed, 
multiple Circuit Courts of Appeals have followed Torres-
Garcia and held that an alien who is inadmissible under § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) is not eligible for retroactive consent to 
reapply for admission under 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 and, 
consequently, cannot adjust status pursuant to § 1255(i).  See 
Gonzalez-Balderas v. Holder, 597 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“[A]n application for retroactive relief . . . cannot be 
granted when the effect would be to lift the ten-year bar.”); 
Delgado v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The 
                                                                                                     
Form I-212 to the immigration judge for 
adjudication.  
 17 
 
BIA has expressly held, however, that 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 does 
not operate as a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(9) . . . .”); Gonzales v. DHS, 508 F.3d 1227, 1242 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]n applicant who is inadmissible under 
subsection (a)(9)(C)(i)(II) is also ineligible to adjust his status 
under the special adjustment provision from within the United 
States.  The alien is bound by subsection (a)(9)(C)(ii) . . . .”); 
see also In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 371 (“[A]liens who 
are inadmissible under section 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) of the Act 
cannot qualify for section 245(i) adjustment, absent a waiver 
of inadmissibility.”).  We also will adhere to the statute‟s 
plain language.  Nothing in 8 C.F.R. § 212.2 confers 
jurisdiction on an IJ to consider Sarango‟s consent request in 
direct contravention of the plain text of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).  
Consequently, Sarango is incorrect that this regulation 
preserved the IJ‟s jurisdiction to consider her retroactive 
consent request.   
 
In sum, the BIA correctly concluded that the IJ lacked 
jurisdiction to consider Sarango‟s “nunc pro tunc” request for 
consent to reapply for admission pursuant to § 
1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).
10
    
                                              
10
  Rather than stay or remand Sarango‟s petition while 
she applied for consent to reapply for admission from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the BIA dismissed Sarango‟s 
petition outright because it determined Sarango could not 
demonstrate prima facie eligibility for a § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) 
inadmissibility waiver.  We agree with the BIA‟s disposition.  
The § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii) exception provision explicitly requires 
that an alien wait ten years from the prior removal date before 
seeking consent to reapply.  But Sarango departed the United 
States in February 1999 and reentered after just one year in 
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we deny Sarango‟s Petition 
for Review. 
                                                                                                     
August 2000.  Therefore, even if 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(i) permitted 
Sarango to apply for nunc pro tunc relief, she did not satisfy 
the ten-year wait-to-reenter requirement.  Accordingly, we will 
deny her petition. 
